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nIn the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the role of strongly interconnectedmarkets in causing systemic instability has
been increasingly acknowledged. Trade networks of commodities are susceptible to cascades of supply shocks that
increase systemic trade risks and pose a threat to geopolitical stability. We show that supply risk, scarcity, and price
volatility of nonfuel mineral resources are intricately connected with the structure of the worldwide trade networks
spanned by these resources. At the global level, we demonstrate that the scarcity of a resource is closely related to the
susceptibility of the tradenetworkwith respect to cascading shocks. At the regional level, we find that, to someextent,
region-specific price volatility and supply risk can be understood by centrality measures that capture systemic trade
risk. The resources associated with the highest systemic trade risk indicators are often those that are produced as by-
products of major metals. We identify significant strategic shortcomings in themanagement of systemic trade risk, in
particular in the European Union. lo o
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 INTRODUCTION
Commodity price volatility has long been identified by political econo-
mists as a hindrance to sustainable economic development [for exam-
ple, the Dutch Disease (1)] as well as a catalyst of geopolitical crises.
Although traditionally associated with fossil fuel resources, the crit-
icality of nonfuel mineral resources has become increasingly relevant
because of their increasing importance in cutting-edge technological
and medical applications (2). With the explosive growth of financial
derivatives on commodities and a subsequent investment boom (and
bust) in themid-2000s, there is growing evidence that resource criticality,
loosely defined as the importance of a resource to production processes,
has become increasingly susceptible to financial perturbations from both
within and outside the commodities sector (3, 4). A better understanding
of the interconnected nature of commodity markets would allow policy-
makers to hedge against threats to industrial sectors and reduce the risk of
geopolitical instabilities induced by the price volatility of critical resources.
Systemic risk is often defined as the risk that a large fraction of a
system will collapse as a consequence of seemingly minor and local
shocks that initially only affect a small part of the system. Because of
the interconnectedness of the system, these shocksmay cause secondary
effects that eventually propagate through the entire network. Awareness
of systemic risk has greatly increased in the finance literature in thewake
of the 2008 financial crisis (5, 6). For financial systems, it has been
shown that systemic risk is, to a large extent, a network effect in which
external shocks to a single financial institution result in a sudden reduc-
tion of financial flows to other institutions, causing distress for them as
well (7). This chain of reduced financial flows can spread through the
system, potentially leading to positive feedback dynamics and resulting
in a strong reduction of the total net worth of financial institutions (8). It
has been shown that the vulnerability of a system to such cascading
shocks can be assessed by network centrality measures and related
concepts (9–13).
It is becoming increasingly clear that the security of supply can only
be understood in a framework that acknowledges the global intercon-
nections among systems of resource production and trading (14, 15).
Here, we show that the likelihood of price disruptions in mineral pricesis strongly related to the structure of the trade network of a particular
resource. We introduce a novel method to assess the systemic risk level
of trade networks and demonstrate its validity on 71 actual trade net-
works of resources. At the global level, we show that the scarcity of a
resource is strongly related to the structural properties of its underlying
trade network. The scarcer a resource is, the more susceptible it is to
cascading shocks in the trade network. At the regional level, we show
that the volatility of mineral prices within several world regions, in par-
ticular the United States and the European Union (EU), is closely re-
lated to specific network centrality measures that we propose to
quantify systemic trade risk. We find that price disruptions in mineral
resources also reflect cascades of supply shocks in the underlying trade
network. The impact of these cascades, to some extent, can bemitigated
by lowering trade barriers. We find the highest systemic trade risks in
resources that are produced as by-products of other resources. It has
been argued that these resources are especially prone to price disrup-
tions because it is hard to predict whether their global supply will react
to changes in global demand (16).RESULTS
“TradeRisk”: An indicator for systemic trade risk
We work with 71 nonfuel mineral resources as provided by the U.S.
Geological Survey (USGS) in Mineral Commodity Summaries (17).
For readers not familiar with the concepts and centrality measures of
network science, we refer to the SupplementaryMaterials andMethods,
where we give a brief and self-contained introduction to the network
concepts used in this work. For each of these resources, r, we construct
the network of international cross-border trade flowsMij
r(t). The result
is a so-called multiplex network where nodes (i,j) represent countries
that are connected by different types of links, r, that represent trade
in different commodities. The entries in Mij
r(t) represent the amount
of resource r in U.S. dollars that flows from country i to country jwithin
year t. Details on howMij
r(t) is extracted from the data are discussed in
Materials and Methods.
The vulnerability to supply shocks inmineral imports of countries has
a strong geopolitical component. Imports from countries that are politi-
cally unstable aremore prone to supply restrictions than are imports from
countries that are politically stable (18). The World Bank indicator “Po-
litical Stability andAbsence of Violence,” pi(t), measures the likelihood of1 of 7
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 political, social, or economic distress in country i in year t (19).pi(t) ranges
from 0 to 100. High values indicate high political stability. As an
alternative to the Political Stability indicator, we also use the Resource
Governance Index gi insteadofpi(t). gimeasures thequality of governance
in the oil, gas, and mining sectors on a scale from 0 to 100 (20).
The network-based vulnerability of country j to shocks in the trade
network of mineral r, due to supply restrictions from another country i,
is given by the trade risk multiplex network Vij
r(t), defined as
Vrij tð Þ ¼ 1−
piðtÞ
100
 
MrijðtÞ
∑
i
MrijðtÞ
ð1Þ
Vij
r(t) is the fraction of country j’s imports of commodity r from i in
year t, weighted by how likely country i is to experience political or social
disturbances. The trade risk vulnerability network Vij
r(t) is shown for
copper, lithium, and platinum group metals in Fig. 1.
Imagine a country that receives its imports from a large number of
politically stable countries that in turn all rely on imports from a single,
politically unstable country. Clearly, any measure for supply risk that is
only based on trade flowswith direct neighbors in the trade networkwill
not take such situations into account. However, these influences can be
quantified by recursive centrality measures, for example, the PageRank
(21). The PageRank Pi
r(t) of country i in the trade risk network for re-
source r at time t is given by solutions to the recursive equation
Pri tð Þ ¼ a∑
j
1
krout; jðtÞ
Vrji tð ÞPrj tð Þ þ 1 − að Þ ð2Þ
of thePageRank,wherekout,j
r(t) is the out-degree (numberof countries into
which r is exported) of j (note that, here, we use the convention that origins
of trade flows are denoted by the first index and that recipients are denoted
by the second index). These countries pass the shock on to countries thatKlimek, Obersteiner, Thurner Sci. Adv. 2015;1:e1500522 13 November 2015import from them, and so on. The parameter (1− a) can be understood as
the contribution to supply shocks due to effects that are not related to the
trade risk network. Equation 2 only converges fora < 1/lr(t), where lr(t) is
the largest eigenvalue ofVr. If not explicitly stated otherwise, we adopt the
standard convention by settinga =0.85/lr(t) [see, for example, thework of
Newman (21)]. We next compute the time average of the normalized
PageRank contributions, Pri ¼ 〈Pri ðtÞ=jPrðtÞj〉t , where 〈 ⋅ 〉t denotes the
average over the years 2000 to 2012 and | ⋅ | denotes the 2-norm. Pi
r is a
measure for how likely country i is to be affected by supply shocks in any
other country, even when there is no direct trade relation between these
countries. A potential shock in country j will be distributed in units of
(1/kout,j
r(t)) to all countries that import from j. This corresponds to the situa-
tion where a certain reduction of outflows of resource r from country j is
equally likely to be transmitted to each of the countries that receive r from j,
but there is nomultiplier effect such that all countries will inherit the total
contributions to risk from j. Instead, this risk will be split among all the
recipients.
Countrieswill onlybevulnerable to changes in their imports ofmineral
r if they have a nonzero import reliance Ii
r. Ii
r quantifies how strongly the
economy of country i depends on imports of resource r (seeMaterials and
Methods). Finally, we arrive at the network-based impact of supply shocks
for resource r for country i, which we call TradeRisk Ti
r. It is given by
Tri ¼ Pri I ri ð3Þ
For each network layer inVij
r(t), all the following networkmeasures
are averaged over the years 2000 to 2012. The average degree kr is the
average number of nonzero links per node for a given resource r. Cr is
the number of nodes that are part of the largest strongly connected
component (SCC) divided by the number of nodes in the network.
The SCC is the largest subset of nodes where each node can be reached
on the network from every other node. The largest eigenvalue, lr, of Vr
is ameasure for how susceptible the trade risk networkVr is to epidemic
spreading processes. The larger lr is, the easier it is for a small shock to
propagate through the entire network (22). In this sense, 1/lr can be
seen as a measure for the resilience of the network. The scarcity sr of
a commodity r is defined as the logarithmic quotient of the total trade
volume and the estimated exploitable reservesRr, sr= log (vr/Rr). Results
for several indicator values for individual resources are given in table S1.
We define the adjacency multiplex as Bij
r(t) = 1, if Vij
r(t) > 0 from
Eq. 1, and Bij
r(t) = 0 otherwise. The in-degree of country j, kin,j
r, is given
by krin;j ¼ 〈∑iBrijðtÞ〉t . kin,jr is the number of countries that contribute to
at least 1% i’s of total imports of mineral r, averaged over all available
years. The in-strength win,j
r for country j is given by wrin;j ¼ 〈∑iV rijðtÞ〉t .
Note that win,j
r can be seen as a weighted average of the political stability
of the countries that export r to i. The weights are the fractions of i’s total
imports in r that the particular countries j provide. We consider an alter-
native formulation of the TradeRisk indicator by replacing the PageRank
Pi
r in Eq. 3with the in-strengthwin,i
r.We call this indicator the In-Strength
TradeRisk T str;ri ¼ wrin;iI ri .
To test our results for significance of network effects, we generate several
randomizedversionsof thedata (see alsoMaterials andMethods). In the first
randomization,Mrfix degree(t), we keep the average degree kr fixed, and each
trade flow gets assigned a randomly selected importing and exporting
country. The second randomization,Mrfix in-deg(t), randomizes the exporting
country for each trade flow but keeps the importing country fixed. In the
third randomization,Mrfix in-/out-deg(t), the importing andexporting countries
are fixed, but the values of the nonzero trade flows are randomly permuted.Fig. 1. The worldwide trade risk network for nonfuel minerals. (A to C)
The worldwide trade risk network for nonfuel minerals, represented as a
multiplex trade network Vij
r(t), where each layer corresponds to one mineral
resource: (A) copper, (B) lithium, and (C) platinum group metals. We study
the network topology of each of these layers and compute both regional
(node-based, country-specific) and global (network-based) measures. We
study the relationships between supply risk, price volatility, network central-
ity, and trade barriers for the United States and the EU (world regions high-
lighted in green on the world map).2 of 7
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 Global results: Resilience and trade networks
We find that the composite supply risk Sr has a weak negative correla-
tion with the largest eigenvalue lr ofVr (Pearson correlation coefficient
r=−0.32,P=0.026; seeTable 1). Sr is also negatively correlatedwith the
size of the SCC, Cr (r = −0.41, P = 0.0039). A high production concen-
trationmay indicate a small SCC and consequently an increased supply
risk. Both the largest eigenvalue lr and the Cr show a significant corre-
lation with the scarcity sr. The scarcer a resource is, the less resilient the
trade risk network is to supply shocks and the higher is the largest
eigenvalue lr (r = 0.47, P = 0.0011). These correlations are not
confounded by the influence of the trading volume, vr, itself, as seen
by the nonsignificant correlations of lr and Crwith vr. The logarithmic
average degree log kr has only a significant correlation with resource
scarcity (r = 0.31, P= 0.041). This suggests that the scarcer the resource,
the more vulnerable to cascading effects (of initially localized shocks)
the underlying trade network. This network-based vulnerability cannot
be explained by lower trade volumes of scarce resources. Note that the
trade flows for each country are normalized by the country’s total ex-
ports of that resource in Eq. 1.
Results for the supply risk Sr, scarcity sr, and trade volume vr for the
randomized trade networksMrfix degree(t) are shown in table S2. By con-Klimek, Obersteiner, Thurner Sci. Adv. 2015;1:e1500522 13 November 2015
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risk and the scarcity of a resource are preserved under this randomiza-
tion (see table S3). However, the largest eigenvalue lr has no signifi-
cant correlationwith the supply risk Sr or the scarcity sr, respectively, in the
randomized data. This shows that resilience to cascading shocks as ob-
served in the real data is indeed a genuine network effect that cannot be
explained by the number of trade flows alone, which is preserved under
this randomization. To anticipate how the imports into a country of a par-
ticular resourcewill be affectedby a shock in adifferent country, one there-
fore needs to take the structure of the entire trade network into account.
Region-specific results: Price volatility and network effects
Region-specific results are computed for the EU and the United States.
Results for the EU are obtained by condensing the 25 EU members of
2012 into a single node and by computing the TradeRisk, TEU
r, in the
corresponding network. There is a highly significant correlation be-
tween price volatility of the resource r in the EU, sEU
r, and TradeRisk
(r = 0.71, P < 10−4) (see Fig. 2A). This correlation is a genuine net-
work effect. To show this, we consider an alternative formulation of the
TradeRisk indicator by replacing TEU
r with the In-Strength TradeRisk
TEU
str,r. Table 2 shows that the TradeRisk TEU
r has a higher correlation
with price volatility than with any of the other indicators: the import
reliance IEU
r, the PageRank PEU
r, and the In-Strength TradeRisk TEU
str,r.
To understand the impact of higher-order network effects on volatility
of resource prices, we study the linear partial correlation, rpartial, between
TEU
r and sEU
r, controlling for the influence of TEU
str,r. The partial corre-
lation rpartial can be interpreted as the amount of variance in sEU
r that
can only be explained by knowledge of the entire trade risk network,
after the influence of direct neighbors in the network has been removed.
We find that rpartial = 0.68 (P < 10
−4), which means that about 96% of
the original correlation between price volatility and TradeRisk (which
was r = 0.71) can be attributed to genuine network effects. Basically,
the same observations also hold for the United States (see Fig. 2B). The
TradeRisk indicator explains price fluctuations, sUS
r (r = 0.58, P < 10−5),
better than the In-Strength TradeRisk, the import reliance, or the
PageRank alone. After controlling for the influence of the In-Strength
TradeRiskTUS
str,r, we findapartial correlationofrpartial = 0.38 (P=0.0032)Table 1. Global properties of the trade networks for each resource r.
The elements are Pearson correlation coefficients. The composite supply
risk Sr is negatively correlated with the largest eigenvalue, lr, and the
size of the SCC, Cr. Cr is positively correlated with both the total trading
volume and the scarcity of the resource. The higher the scarcity of the
mineral is, the lower is the resilience to shocks of the trade risk network.
These correlations cannot be explained by a potentially confounding
influence of the trade volume itself, as seen by the nonsignificant cor-
relations of lr and Cr with vr.Correlation coefficient Sr sr vrLargest eigenvalue, lr −0.32* 0.47** 0.21SCC size, Cr −0.41** 0.45*** 0.05*Significant at P < 0.05. **Significant at P < 0.01. ***Significant at P < 0.001. ruary 17, 2016Fig. 2. TradeRisk versus price volatility for the EU and the United States. Each point represents a mineral resource. (A and B) The country-
specific TradeRisk indicator for (A) the EU and (B) the United States is significantly correlated with both the average yearly price volatility of the
specific mineral and the composite supply risk, indicated by color. Resources with high Sr tend to be on the right-hand side. We also show the
correlation coefficients rvol and rCSR of the price volatility with TradeRisk and composite supply risk, respectively, together with the P values to
reject the null hypothesis that the true correlation coefficient is 0.3 of 7
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 between TradeRisk and price volatility. This substantiates that the
“systemic trade risk” indicator TradeRisk is indeed “systemic” in the
sense that the results are not driven by contributions to price volatilities
from direct neighbors in the networks but by systemwide contributions
fromall over the network. In both regions, the EUand theUnited States,
there is a significant correlation between TradeRisk and supply risk Sr
(see Fig. 2). This result is not surprising because both indicators explic-
itly depend on the import reliance and political stability of the top-
producing countries.
To further emphasize the importance of trade network effects, we
study the influence of the PageRank parameter a (see Eq. 2) on the cor-
relation coefficients between TradeRisk and price volatility for the EU
and the United States. Note that for a = 0, the network contributions in
Eq. 2 are completely neglected and the contributions to TradeRisk orig-
inate only from the import reliance. By increasinga, one puts increasing
weight on network contributions; that is, countries inherit systemic
trade risk if they import fromcountries that are systemically risky them-
selves. As a approaches 1, PageRank is dominated by these recursive
network effects. Indeed, as shown in fig. S1, we find an increasing trend
of both correlations by increasing a. This confirms that the results
shown in Fig. 2 are driven by the susceptibility of individual countries
to cascading effects that are transmitted through the trade networks.
Table 2 shows significant differences between the United States
and the EU with respect to the correlations of TradeRisk with the
applied level of protection of domestic industries from the import
of resource r, the trade barriers bi
r. The United States tends to use
lower trade barriers for the import of resources with high systemic
trade risk, whereas there is no significant relation between TradeRisk
and bEU
r in the EU. Table 2 also shows that the high correlation be-
tween TradeRisk and bUS
r is driven by the PageRank contributions to
systemic trade risk, which shows that the United States has lower
barriers for resources where it has a high network-based vulnera-
bility (and not necessarily a high import reliance). These results are
noteworthy because they offer hints at how countries could use
trade barriers to protect themselves against systemic trade risk
(see Discussion).
Replacing the political stability pi(t) with the Resource Governance
Indicator gi in Eq. 1 does not change the region-specific results, as re-
ported in table S3. This suggests that pi(t) and gi basically convey the
same information in terms of network-based vulnerability to systemic
trade risk. Table S3 also shows region-specific results for the case where
each country is assigned the same score for pi(t) = 0. This eliminates all
information on the political stability of the individual countries. In thisKlimek, Obersteiner, Thurner Sci. Adv. 2015;1:e1500522 13 November 2015case, the TradeRisk indicator Ti
r still shows a higher correlation with
price volatility than with import reliance Ii
r.
To study the robustness of the region-specific results, we compare
the correlation coefficients of the price volatilities of Table 2 with results
from three randomized data sets, as described in Materials and
Methods. Results are shown in table S3. For the import reliance, the
results do not change under any of the randomization schemes by con-
struction. Results for the In-Strength TradeRisk are preserved under the
randomizationsMrfix in-deg(t) andM
r
fix in-/out-deg(t), which keep the in-
degrees and both the in-degrees and the out-degrees fixed, respectively.
This is not the case for the randomizationMrfix degree(t), which only pre-
serves the average degrees of the networks. Here, we still find significant
correlations between the In-Strength TradeRisk and price volatilities
that are substantially lower than those for the real data. These correlations
can be attributed to the influence of the importing countries’ pi(t) values,
which do not change under any of the randomization schemes. The cor-
relations between price volatilities and both TradeRisk and PageRank are
only significant for the randomization scheme Mrfix in-/out-deg(t). The
numbers of the exporting and importing trading partners of a country
(that is, the in- and out-degrees) only partially determine the TradeRisk
of a given country. This confirms again that there are substantial contri-
butions to systemic trade risk that can only be explained by taking the
entire network of trade flows into account.
High-risk resources
The resource with the highest TradeRisk for the EU is beryllium. The
primary application of beryllium is in manufacturing connectors and
switches for lightweight precision instruments in the aerospace and de-
fense industries (17). Eighty-five percent of the world supply of berylli-
um is mined in the United States; much of the remainder comes from
China. Consequently, the TradeRisk for theUnited States ismuch lower
than that for the EU. Indium has the second highest TradeRisk in the
EU and the third highest TradeRisk in the United States. It is essential
for manufacturing liquid crystal displays. Indium is produced almost
exclusively as a by-product of zinc mining (23). If demand for indium
goes up, its availability will not necessarily increase because this avail-
ability is largely determined by zinc economics. The highest TradeRisk
for the United States is found for thallium, which is crucial formedical
imaging.Global supply of thallium is relatively constrained for theUnited
States, especially because China eliminated several tax benefits on the
export of thallium in 2006 (17). We also find a high TradeRisk in the
United States for gallium and vanadium. Gallium is almost exclusively
produced as a by-product of aluminum mining, whereas vanadium isTable 2. Regional results for the correlations of TradeRisk indicators, price volatilities, and trade barriers. Price volatility of mineral resources
is best explained using the TradeRisk indicator for both the EU and the United States. There are also significant correlations between price volatility
and import reliance, PageRank, and In-Strength TradeRisk. The level of applied protection (trade barriers) bi
r is negatively correlated with TradeRisk
in the United States but not in the EU.Correlation with Comments sEU
r sUS
r bEU
r bUS
rTradeRisk Ti
r Full network effects and import reliance 0.71*** 0.58*** −0.11 −0.39**Import reliance Ii
r No use of trade networks 0.48** 0.51*** −0.15 −0.10PageRank Pi
r Full network effects, no import reliance used 0.56*** 0.45*** −0.23 −0.43***In-Strength TradeRisk Ti
str,r No network effects (only contributions from the nearest neighbors and import reliance) 0.39* 0.50*** −0.12 −0.11*Significant at P < 0.05. **Significant at P < 0.01. ***Significant at P < 0.001.4 of 7
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 produced as a by-product of uraniummining (23). We find a compa-
rably high TradeRisk for tellurium in the EU (data for theUnited States
are withheld to avoid disclosing proprietary company data). Tellurium
is mined as a by-product of copper and is critical for manufacturing
solar panels (23). Overall, these findings suggest that resources that
are mined as a by-product of others and for which supply is therefore
not necessarily directly determined by demand exhibit higher systemic
trade risks than major metals or other minerals. Note that being mined
as a by-product does not strictly imply a decoupling of supply and de-
mand because sometimes the intensity of by-product extraction can be
adjusted tomeet changes in demand.Also, our analysis does not include
private trade in by-products that is not captured in public databases.
Incompleteness in the data here corresponds to missing links in the
trade networks. However, the network approach developed in this work
is well equipped to overcome such limitations because many of the
statistical properties of networks studied in this work, for example,
the largest eigenvalues, SCC, or centrality measures, show relatively
high levels of robustness under the random removal of individual links
and therefore incomplete or missing data (21).
In general, we find higher TradeRisk values in the EU than in the
United States (see table S3). The highest value of TradeRisk in the EU
is 0.44 for beryllium, whereas its maximum is 0.19 for thallium in the
United States.
The TradeRisk rank of individual resources for the EU and the
United States is presented in Fig. 3. Each resource is ranked according
to its TradeRisk values in the EU and theUnited States. The lowest rank
corresponds to the highest TradeRisk, and the highest rank corresponds
to the lowest. Colors in Fig. 3 indicate whether the resources are cate-Klimek, Obersteiner, Thurner Sci. Adv. 2015;1:e1500522 13 November 2015gorized as (i) major metals, (ii) by-products of major metals, or (iii)
other resources (16).Minerals that have relatively highTradeRisk values
in both countries tend to be mined as by-products, whereas major
metals have intermediate TradeRisk values. o
n
 February 17, 2016
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The core of this study is that we demonstrate that the structure of the
international trading network of critical resources contains information
that explains a large fraction of the price volatility of these resources.
This information is quantified by a systemic risk measure, TradeRisk.
We find that TradeRisk shows strongly significant correlations with the
price volatilities of resources in the EU (Pearson correlation coefficient
r = 0.71, which is the square root of the explained variance) and in the
United States (r = 0.58). The correlation between TradeRisk and price
volatility is therefore substantially higher in the EU than in the United
States. These results are driven by the network contributions to TradeRisk.
To show this,we consider thepartial correlation,rpartial, betweenTradeRisk
and price volatilities after removing the influence of all nonnetwork
contributions to TradeRisk. These contributions are given by the In-
Strength TradeRisk measure that depends only on the import reliance
of a country and its trade with direct neighbors in the network. The
partial correlation between TradeRisk and price volatilities given the
In-Strength TradeRisk can be interpreted as the variation in the price
volatilities of resources that can only be explained by network effects.
We find that the remaining correlation between TradeRisk and price
volatilities, after the removal of all nonnetwork contributions, remains
strongly significant in the EU, rpartial = 0.68, whereas it is substantially
lower in the United States, rpartial = 0.38. In addition, we find that the
United States systematically uses lower trade barriers for resources of
high systemic trade risk and high network-based vulnerability, whereas
there are no suchmeasures used by the EU. Therefore, there is reason to
assume that lower trade barriers for systemically risky resources might
indeed reduce the impact of cascading supply shocks on the prices of
resources.
These findings indicate that there are currently significant shortcom-
ings in the risk management of nonfuel mineral resources, in particular
in the EU. This arises because systemic failure due to cumulative effects
of cascading shocks on an intricately interconnected system is not taken
into account. This is particularly salient in light of the observation that
many of the resources that aremost susceptible to systemic risk are only
produced as by-products and play a crucial role in industries vital to
national interests.
A number of policy implications emerge from this analysis of sys-
temic trade risk. Although trade in commodities or critical resources
will always involve some degree of imperfect information, better
monitoring and data transparency are needed to adopt a more robust
approach to understanding risks that can be foreseen by taking network
effects into account. Policy instruments capable of mitigating systemic
risk would allow decision-makers to implement measures, such as stra-
tegic physical reserves and trade regulations, that mitigate market vol-
atility while ensuring physical supply. In financial networks, it has been
shown that systemic financial risk can be almost completely eliminated
bymeans of a so-called systemic risk tax (24). This is amacroprudential
regulation approach where a levy is placed on systemically risky finan-
cial transactions to offset the systemic risk increase associated with that
transaction. Motivated by this approach, it is conceivable that similarFig. 3. Ranks of TradeRisk in the EU and the United States. Each
point represents a single resource. Rank 1 is given to the resource with
the highest TradeRisk in the given region, rank 2 is given for the second
highest TradeRisk, and so on. Resources where information is only avail-
able for either the EU or the United States are shown outside the plot
area. Major metals are shown as black boxes, minerals that are by-
products are shown as gray circles, and other minerals are shown as light
gray diamonds. It is clearly visible that minerals that have high TradeRisk
values in both regions are mined as by-products, whereas the major metals
exhibit intermediate TradeRisk values.5 of 7
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 MATERIALS AND METHODS
Minerals trade data
The minerals included in this study were taken from Mineral
Commodity Summaries, which is published by the USGS annually
(17). These summaries contain information on industry structure, sa-
lient statistics, and world production and resources for 71mineral com-
modities. The summaries also list tariff codes for each mineral in the
Harmonized System classification. We collected trade data for tariff
codes for each commodity as provided by the UN Comtrade data,
spanning the years 2000 to 2012 (25). Tariff codes that were not specific
to a particular resource, such as the code 2530.90 (“other mineral sub-
stances”), were excluded. Note that the tariff codes for the resources
provided by the USGS do not include products that contain the partic-
ular resource and thatmight be used for its extraction. Therefore, we did
not consider transformation along the value chain of resources. We in-
cluded all countries for which trade data for any of the minerals exist in
any of these years. This amounts to 107 countries. Trade flows between
country i and country j in resource r in year t were recorded in the
matrixMij
r(t).Mij
r(t) is the value of resource rmeasured in U.S. dollars
that flows from country i to country j.
For each trade flow, there should exist two records in the data: one
for the importing country j and one for the exporting country i. Because
of the incompleteness of the data in some cases, these two entries do not
match.Mij
r(t) is defined as the larger value of these two entries.Mij
r(t) is
a time-dependent multiplex network in which the nodes correspond to
countries and where each network layer is the international trade
network of a given mineral r. In a similar manner, we constructed the
multiplex Kij
r(t), where each entry corresponds to the trade flow of re-
source r from country i to country j in year t, as measured in kilograms.
We only included trade flows thatmake upmore than 1% of a country’s
imports, meaning that Mij
r(t)/∑iMij
r(t) > 0.01 holds.
Price and volatility
The price for resource r as measured in U.S. dollars per kilogram in
country i, xi(r,t), was obtained from the trade data as xi(r,t) = ∑jMij
r(t)/
∑jKij
r(t). xi(r,t) corresponds to the average free-on-board value of resource
r in country i, that is, the transaction value of the goods and the value of
services performed to deliver the goods to the border of the exporting
country. The logarithmic annual return on resource r in country i is yi
(r,t) = log(xi(r,t)/xi(r,t − 1)). The volatility of resource r in country i, si
r,
is the SD of yi(r,t), computed over the time span t ∈ [2000,2012].
Total trade volume and reserves
The total trade volume of a resource r in year t, v(r,t), is the sum over all
trade flows measured in kilograms, that is, v(r,t)= ∑i,jKij
r(t). Estimates
for the available reserves of a mineral r, Rr, were taken from the latest
estimates from the USGS (17). These estimates reflect the future supply
of identified and currently undiscovered resources that are economical-
ly extractable, taking into account recycled resources as well.
Import reliance
The vulnerability of a country i to supply shocks in resource r is strongly
related to the net import reliance of i on r. If i is a net exporter of r, then iKlimek, Obersteiner, Thurner Sci. Adv. 2015;1:e1500522 13 November 2015will be less affected by supply shocks than a country where the economy
relies on imports of resource r. The level of import reliance is quan-
tified by the import reliance indicator Ii
r(t) for country i on resource
r in year t. For the United States, the data on Ii
r(t) are provided by the
USGS on an annual basis and are defined as the imports minus ex-
ports, plus adjustments for government and industry stock exchanges
(17). Ii
r(t) is measured as a percentage of this apparent consumption,
averaged over the time span t ∈ [2000,2012]. Values for the import
reliance of the EU are available from the European Commission
(EC) (26) for the year 2006.
Composite supply risk
There exist various ways to quantify the supply risk for resources. The
(U.S.) National Research Council (NRC) provides estimates of supply
risks for 11minerals based on import reliance, concentration of the pro-
duction of the resource, and substitutability (27). The British Geological
Survey (BGS) publishes supply risk indicators for 41 minerals, taking
into account their scarcity, production concentration, reserve
distribution, recycling rate, substitutability, and governance aspects
of the top-producing and reserve-hosting nations (28). The EC re-
leases supply risk indicators for 41materials based on production con-
centration, political stability of the producing countries, and
substitutability and recycling of the materials (26). We rescaled each
of these lists of values such that the mineral with the highest supply
risk was assigned a value of 1 and the lowest supply risk was assigned a
value of 0. The composite supply risk formineral r, Sr, is defined as the
average over the rescaled supply risks provided by the NRC, the BGS,
and the EC. Note that although the individual supply risk indicators
are often region-specific, we regard the composite supply risk Sr as a
global indicator.
Trade barriers
The trade barriers bi
r are defined as the average value of all ad valorem
equivalent tariffs per unit applied to all trade flows into region i that
involve resource r, as obtained from the MAcMap database (29).
Randomized data sets
To investigate the robustness of our results, we considered three differ-
ent randomization schemes of the trade flow matrixMr(t). The rando-
mization Mrfix degree(t) was obtained as a random permutation of all
elements of Mr(t). That is, each trade flow in Mr(t) was assigned a
new importing and exporting country that was chosen at random from
all countries.Mrfix degree(t) had the same average degree and total trade
volume asMr(t) but was otherwise completely randomized. The second
randomization,Mrfix in-deg(t), was obtained fromM
r(t) by replacing the
exporting country for each trade flow by a randomly chosen country.
This randomization procedure preserves not only the average degree
and the trade volume but also the in-strength and in-degree of each
country. Network properties that involve the nearest neighbors of a node,
such as eigenvalues, may change under this randomization. In the third
randomization, we constructed the trade flow matrix Mrfix in-/out-deg(t)
in the following way. Let Lr(t) be the set of links (that is, nonzero trade
flows) inMr(t), and letWr(t) be the corresponding set of link weights.
Mrfix in-/out-deg(t) was obtained by keeping L
r(t) fixed and by replacing
Wr(t) by a randompermutationof its elements.Mr(t) andMrfix in-/out-deg(t)
only differ by the volumes of the nonzero trade flows. All results involv-
ing randomized data were averaged over 100 independent realizations
of the randomization procedure.6 of 7
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